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NO NEW PROPERTY
Richard A. Epstein*

I. A CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARK
Goldberg v. Kelly1 does not rank with the most important
decisions in the history of the Supreme Court. It did not establish judicial review, as did Marbury v. Madison.2 Nor did it
usher in the Civil War, as did Scott v. Sandford.3 It did not legitimate Jim Crow in the South, as did Plessy v. Ferguson,4 nor
did it help undo it as did Brown v. Board of Education. It did
not stand testimony to substantive due process or economic liberties, as did Lochner v. New York,6 nor did it create a constitutional right to abortion as did Roe v. Wade.7 Goldberg v. Kelly
did not launch a war or define a generation. Although thundering greatness shall forever elude it, Goldberg nonetheless rates
at the very top of the second tier of great Supreme Court cases,
those which organize and structure a large portion of the ongoing dialogue within the legal system. It is at the same high level
of, perhaps, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" and Baker v.
Carr,9 both also written by Justice Brennan.
Spurred on by Charles Reich's important article, The New
Property,10 Justice Brennan's opinion in Goldberg represents
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This paper is a revised and extended version of a speech that the author presented
at Brooklyn Law School on May 4, 1990 as part of its conference: The Legacy of

Goldberg v. Kelly- A Twenty Year Perspective. The author would like to thank David
Lawson for his usual stellar research assistance.
2 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

1 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1856).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
* 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official must prove actual malice before recovering
damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to his official conduct).
9 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (announcing the "one man, one vote" rule).
4

10 Reich, The New Property,73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964), cited in Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
262 n.8. Justice Brennan also quotes extensively from Reich's companion piece directed
at welfare benefits in particular. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
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one of those rare efforts to transform a set of academic and philosophical insights about the nature of property into the imperative language of constitutional law. Although the decision itself
has been subjected to endless elaboration, qualification and even
contraction over the years,11 its importance, if not its influence,
continues to grow with time. The case has been the subject of
extensive commentary, which, with some exceptions, 2 has been
largely sympathetic to its aspirations, even if somewhat troubled
about the application of its doctrine in discrete contexts.13 I
hope that it will not be treated as a sign of disrespect to say that
Goldberg v. Kelly was wrongly decided. There is no "new property," and Justice Brennan's efforts first to create and then to
defend the "new property" are in my view likely to do more
harm than good.
The outline of this Article is as follows. In section II, I shall
identify various types of property in order to determine which of
them require special legal treatment and which do not. I begin
this section by examining the justifications that might be offered
for the old standard forms of property at common law, with its
orientation that property rights arise from the actions of the
people governed, and not by the dictates of the state. In section
III, I shall apply the general analysis to what I call, somewhat
inelegantly, "the old, new property," beginning with copyrights
and patents, the forms of "new" property expressly contemplated under the Constitution, and then continuing the analysis
to cover broadcast frequencies and corporate limited liability,
new forms of property (and in a sense, "antiproperty") for which
there is no explicit constitutional authorization.

Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965) [hereinafter Reich, Individual
Rights].
11 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (requiring
pre-dismissal hearing for state-classified civil servants); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) (social security benefits may be withheld without prior evidentiary hearing);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (civil service employees not entitled to pre-dis.
missal hearing).
12 For the exceptions, see, e.g., Verkuil, Revisiting the New PropertyAfter TwentyFive Years, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1990); Williams, Liberty and Property: The
Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983).
'3 See, e.g., J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADmINISTRATIVE STATE 9-10 (1985); F.
MICHELMAN, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PnoCESS, NoMos XVIII 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Friendly, "Some Kind of
Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The
Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885. (1981).
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Section IV then turns to the "new, new property," specifically welfare benefits. In it I urge that, unlike the forms of property just considered, welfare benefits should not be protected
against termination on the ground that they are "property"
under the due process clause. In order to find some warrant to
give constitutional protection against termination of welfare
grants, some explanation must be given to displace the ordinary
rule in private transactions that the party making a grant may
condition that grant as the party sees fit. Yet even after the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is incorporated into the law,
that cannot be done absent some showing of the institutional
abuses that flow from allowing welfare departments to determine their internal procedures. But that showing cannot be
made, for there is no good theoretical or empirical reason to believe that the total efficiency of the welfare program, its budget
held constant, is improved by the introduction of any constitutional safeguards against wrongful termination.
IE. PROPERTY FROM THE BOTTOM Up

In order to make out my claim about the different forms of
new property, it is necessary to sketch out briefly the way in
which a system of common law property rights meshes with the
ideals of the constitutional order. The great American experiment in government was marked by a striking departure from
the English view of property rights, starting with that most
traditional form of property, land. 4
In the feudal English system the King occupied two roles.
On the one hand he was the ultimate protector of the realm who
intervened whenever any person vi et armis, by force and arms,
challenged the peaceable possession of any subject of the realm.
On the other hand, the King was the first lawful possessor of
property rights from whom all persons obtained their title to
land. Property therefore arose not by occupation, but from a
grant by the sovereign, and was subject to whatever terms and
conditions the sovereign attached to that land.
If the English theory of property rights in land had carried
over to the United States, then no private holdings of property
14 The most complete account of the early origin of the English system of land holdings is 1 F. POLLOCK & F. M=m.o. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229 (1898).
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would be more secure than the government grant that conveyed
them. If the grantor imposed certain conditions that had to be
satisfied in order to keep the land, then the grantee would be
required to accept the bitter with the sweet, as it is said, usually
by Justice Rehnquist. 16 Of course, any prospective grantee could
make the judgment ex ante that the condition attached to the
land was too onerous to make the grant worthwhile; museums
make those judgments about bequests all the time when they
turn down artworks left to them on condition. But having made
the fatal decision to accept the property, the grantee, then as
now, is stuck with the condition, however onerous.
The English system of property rights in land, however, did
not carry over to the United States. Ours was not a system in
which property rights started from the top down. Quite the opposite, as inheritors of the Lockean tradition, the basic theory
was that property 'rights emerged from first possession, from
first occupation, from homesteading, and not from state grant.
At this point there was no bitter to take with the sweet. The
basic conception of property rights allowed the owner to take
from the center of the earth to the outer reaches of the heavens.16 It reserved the rights of possession, use and disposition
over the property until the end of time. It was this bundle of
rights that was good against the rest of the world, and which
government had to respect and defend -when it imposed taxes or
restrictions upon use for the common good. Since this first
round of holdings was not dependent upon the will of the state,
the logic of the bargain, hard but fair, has no foundation on
which to rest, for the state cannot withhold property at will.
Limited government is never (or at least in theory should never
be) free to act as it sees fit. It must always justify what it takes
when it takes it.
The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.""' Analogous language in the four-

15

See, e.g., Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-54 (plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist); Ma-

thews, 424 U.S. at 319 (opinion by Justice Powell holding that evidentiary hearing is not
required prior to termination of disability benefits).
"' See Edwards v. Sims, 232 Ky. 791, 793, 24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (1929). On the exceptions, see the discussion of broadcast frequencies, infra.
7 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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teenth amendment limits the power of the states.18 Neither of
these restrictions should be trifled with. If the question were put
to a good Lockean at the time of the founding, he would have
been unable to identify any legal interest that was not swept
into life, liberty or property. The standard Lockean account of
government calls upon each individual to surrender some portion of his property and liberty to the state, and to receive in
exchange the protection that only a well organized set of civic
institutions is able to provide him. The hypothetical deal is not
tentative or partial; there are no things so valuable that the individual citizen is able to keep them outside the social contract
that leads to the formation of the state. Quite the opposite, the
state can take what it needs of property and perhaps liberty (as
with the draft) 9 insofar as they are needed to discharge its fundamental mission. But that mission is to protect all things of
value that all individuals have. Life, liberty and property exhaust the domain of things and relationships capable of legal
protection.
To what extent is this grand Lockean social transaction contingent upon the conceptions of liberty and especially property
that were recognized and understood at the time of the founding? In essence the strong claim contains two parts: (a) the common law provided (and still provides) a complete and self-consistent set of entitlements, and (b) it is only those entitlements
that deserve the protection of the state. On this view, stability is
acquired through government, but, arguably, only at the very
high price of the loss of innovation. While the rules for conveying real estate may well be stable, the constant emergence of
new technological possibilities has rendered feasible, if not imperative, the creation of new forms of property. These new
forms should be recognized by the common law, and by implication included within the scope of constitutional guarantees. The
framers gave no thought to the question of how to allocate property rights in the broadcast spectrum, computer software, or new
micro-organisms. If we insist that property rights were fixed in
total at the time of the framing of the Constitution (or the pas1 US. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1. Amendment XIV,section 1 provides that no "State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
19 See the very unsatisfactory discussion of the issue in The Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding congressional power to compel military service).
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sage of the fourteenth amendment), then these new forms of
property lie wholly outside the scope of constitutional protection. But to whose benefit?
These observations place us in something of a dilemma. On
the one hand, we can assume that there are no new forms of
property rights, in which case it becomes quite difficult to explain some of the most commonplace institutions of our modern
social life. On the other hand, we can admit that there are various forms of new property, but then have to face the prospect
that these will rise up in such rich profusion as to swamp the
traditional forms of property rights to which the Constitution
undoubtedly does apply. Stated otherwise, the question that
must be answered, especially in defending the claim that there is
no "new property," is this: how can we admit new types of interests into the common law system of property rights without having to accept the proposition that the state has untrammeled
discretion to create, and by implication, to abolish, all forms of
property rights by legislative decree? The challenge here is in a
sense universal, for it confronts those (like me) who think that
the common law ideas of property, as embodied in the due process clause, are sufficiently determinate to provide genuine constitutional protection against government misconduct. Yet if this
form of property is entitled to protection, so too are all the
others. Thus in Goldberg, Justice Brennan quotes Professor
Reich as follows:
Society today is built around entitlement. The

automobile dealer has

his franchise, the doctor and the lawyer their professional licenses, the
worker his union membership, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to aid security and
independence. Many of the most important of these entitlements now
flow from government: subsidies to farmers and businessmen, routes
for airlines and channels for television stations; long term contracts
for defense, space, and education; social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, whether private or public are no longer
regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials,
fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor
whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not
20
been effectively enforced.

At one level the argument is overstated because the creation
20

397 U.S. at 262 n.8, quoting Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 10, at 1255.
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of property rights in various forms of intangibles (welfare rights
not included) has long been recognized by judges. To quote but
one instance, consider the language of Judge Grosscup, penned
nearly seventy years before Goldberg, in National Telegraph
News Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.:
Property, even as distinguished from property in intellectual produc-

tion, is not, in its modern sense, confined to that which may be
touched by the hand, or seen by the eye. What is called tangible prop-

erty has come to be, in most great enterprises, but the embodiment,
physically, of an underlying life-a life that, in its contribution to suc-

cess, is immeasurably more effective than the mere physical embodiment. Such, for example, are properties built upon franchises, on

grants of government, on good will, or on trade names, and the like. It
is needless to say, that to every ifgredient of property thus made

up-the intangible as well as the tangible, that which is discernible to
mind only, as well as that susceptible to physical touch-equity extends appropriate protection."1

In this passage the ordinary forms of business property are
recognized as subject to ordinary legal protection. But there is
no obvious extension from these forms of rights to the case of
"welfare rights" that both Brennan and Reich lump together
with them under their banner of "new property." The implicit
logic of Justice Brennan's argument is that the procedural protection of welfare rights against improper termination rests on
the parallel between those rights and other forms of intangibles.
I think that much profit can be gained, first by disaggregating
Professor Reich's list, and second by examining as well certain
other types of rights which he failed to include.
My proposed disaggregation has three separate categories.
First, there are those new institutional arrangements that are
fully accounted for by traditional legal modes of organization:
the long term contract, the pension trust, and the stock option
may be new in the sense that they were not commonly employed
in earlier times. But there is no alteration in the structure of
common law rights that is necessary to make them viable. There
may be new contracts, but no new contract law has to be, or
should be, devised in order to account for them. No further dis119 F. 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1902). For an extended discussion of the issues raised in
connection with property rights in news, see Epstein, International News Serv. v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, VA. L Rm. (1991)
[forthcoming].
21
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cussion of this category is necessary here.
The second category I shall call "the old forms of new property." This category covers rights that have close parallels to
classic common law rights in land and chattels. One example
from this class from Professor Reich's list is broadcast frequencies. In my view the argument can be made to protect these
forms of new property-patents, copyrights, frequency allocations, and. corporate shares, for example.
Finally, I do not believe that it can be made with respect to
the third class on Professor Reich's list, namely, the new sort of
new property to which Goldberg v. Kelly in principle applies,
and which (given the redistributive element) extends to other
forms of subsidies often of ancient lineage, such as those provided to farmers. Professor Reich spends far too much time worrying about the benefit of these programs to their recipients, and
far too little time worrying about their far greater costs to the
persons from whom the subsidies are exacted. "No new new
property" makes a terrible title for a paper, even if it gives an
accurate account of my basic position. It may well be that all
sorts of subsidies and benefit systems are part of American public law. But their administration is not improved by endowing
them with limited constitutional protection against various
forms of procedural deprivation.
III. THE OLD NEW PROPERTY
A.

Copyrights and Patents

Let us begin with an examination of traditional forms of intangible property. Within a general Lockean framework all
property is not owned by the state: can the state then create new
forms of property other than the classic forms that existed at
common law-? Yes, so long as it observes the basic conditions
associated with its own raison d'etre. In each case that it creates
new property rights the state necessarily limits the common law
liberty or property rights of other citizens, for conduct which
was once legal now becomes an invasion, or an infringement, of
the new set of rights that are established. So creation of copyrights and patents is in derogation of common law rights of
property and labor. But stating that point does not-end the inquiry. While the system of patents and copyrights infringes on
ordinary common law freedoms, it also affords in-kind compen-
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sation for the loss of those rights. It could be that the new rights
in question are worth more to the citizenry and each of its members than the rights that are removed. It all depends upon what
rights are created. The situation need not be static. The point
itself is made quite clear in the Constitution itself. Article II,
section eight confers upon Congress the power: "To promote the
Progress of Sciences and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Inventions."
The clause is remarkable in many of its particulars. First, it
only makes sense if the catalog of property rights is not regarded
as both fixed and closed by the common law. There can be new
rights created, and these may be created only for overtly utilitarian ends: only the sciences and the useful arts need apply. In
addition, there is no requirement that the rights so created be in
slavish imitation of the fee simple in land or the perpetual ownership in chattels. Quite the opposite, the power to create new
rights is for "limited times" only, not in perpetuity. But make
no mistake about it, even the limited rights thus created are necessarily in conflict with the traditional common law rights. The
common law system allows persons to use their things so long as
there is no trespass on the property of another. There is no trespass when one person copies the text of a novel written by another or reproduces out of his own materials a device that is invented by another. Yet the moment that a system of "exclusive
rights" is created in both "writings and inventions," the Constitution authorizes a system of new property rights that must now
uneasily cohere with the older, displaced system of common law
property rights. How can it be done?
It is here that we have to look to the other side of the bargain-implicit in-kind compensation-and ask not only what
has been lost, but also what has been gained by creating new
rights in writings and inventions. Those gains are abundant. Initially, it is quite clear that the system of copyrights and patents
that has developed has far more than simple redistributive consequences. The flow of writings and inventions that takes place
is not independent of the legal regime designed to secure the
protection of these rights once created. While there may well be
enormous debates as to the optimal scope and period of protec-
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tion for both writings and inventions22 (and good reason to believe that these are not the same in both cases), it is easy to
imagine some system of protection that trumps the common law
rule of ownership that limits property rights to those things reducible to exclusive physical possession. The incentive to produce depends upon the rate of return from labor, and it is to
"promote" useful labor that the system of protection is there for
Congress to provide if it so chooses.
Substantial gains, therefore, can emerge from the protection
of writings and inventions, and these gains easily exceed the
costs of running an administrative system (a registry or patent
review process) necessary to secure them. In addition, there is
also reason to believe that these gains will be widely distributed
across the population as a whole. The system of copyrights and
patents allows everyone to participate. It gives greater protection to the exertion of labor than does the pure common law
system, and that surely is a theme that resonates with the Lockean labor theory of acquisition. The gains moreover are not confined to those lucky or skillful enough to procure patents and
copyrights. Through a system of voluntary exchange, the gains
can penetrate every nook and cranny of society. Now all of us
can purchase the goods and services made possible or cheaper by
more extensive patent and copyright protection. There is new
property here, but not the "new, new" property. Rather, it is a
form of new property that honors the old verities that lie at the
root of a common law system of property rights. The bottom line
constitutionally is clear: there should be no question that the individual claims to patents and copyrights created pursuant to
congressional statute do qualify as property, protected against
taking without just compensation under either the due process
clause or the eminent domain clause.
B. Broadcast Frequencies and Limited Liability
There are other forms of new property that exist quite comfortably alongside the old property, and here it should suffice to
give but two examples: the broadcast spectrum and limited liability for corporations.
22 See, e.g., Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Landes
& Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
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The broadcast spectrum is not a patent or a copyright. Yet
the creation of new property in broadcast frequencies shows how
a common law method can be invoked to override the exclusive
rights of possession normally associated with the common law
ownership of land. Thus without any special system of property
rights in broadcast signals, the common law must treat any
broadcast as a physical invasion of someone else's property for
which damages, and most critically, injunctive relief are appropriate.2 3 The net result of applying this common law regime of
property rights is that no broadcaster could ever overcome the
coordination problems necessary to send messages to an eager
but vast class of listeners. The value that each landowner has in
excluding broadcasts is purely negative-to hold out in order to
achieve some portion of the gain generated by others. Yet because so many landowners each have that same holdout position,
none of them can exploit it against broadcasters. Preserving the
common law rights to exclude broadcast frequencies thus means
the end of the broadcast industry. The alternative system, which
allows broadcasts routinely over the possible objections of any
single landowner or group of landowners, works to landowners'
universal advantage, for they can then receive the signals that
would be denied to them under a common law regime of absolute exclusion.
There remains still the question of how these frequencies
should be allocated among broadcasters and in this context, the
first possession rules and the trespass law are relevant in a second guise. Historically broadcast frequencies were allocated to
the first users, and the trespass analogies were generally used to
prevent broadcasts over another person's frequency. As signals
do not keep to sharply defined channels, there was necessarily
some fuzziness at the margins, but those reciprocal de minimis
interferences were (as they are today) handled by live-and-letlive type rules drawn by analogy from the law of nuisance. 2 '

IsFor a general account of the subject, see Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 JL. & EcoN. 1 (1959). The present system of allocation by FCC license is
subject to nightmarish complications identified by both Coase and an earlier student
note on the subject. See Comment, "PublicInterest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHL L RaV. 802 (1951). For more recent accounts, see Spitzer,
The FCC and the Courts, 88 YALE U. 717 (1979); J. E.on, FREEDobt TECHNOLOGY AND
THE FrsT A mrmNT 137-203 (1991).
24 See Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex.1862).
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Shortly after the emergence of radio, the government, spurred
on by the Department of the Navy, called in all the frequencies
for reallocation by the Federal Radio Commission.2" Is there any
question that these actions called for scrutiny under the takings
clause? .Given that these property rights were well established
by customary use, were subject to tort protection, were subject
to alienation by agreement, and were subject to taxes, they
surely attained the status of property. It was only the decision
by government to allow existing users to receive valuable frequencies under its revised program that provided, again in-kind,
the compensation needed for the new government program. The
broadcast spectrum is a form of new property well covered by
the old common law rules.
C. Corporations and Limited Liability
The issue of limited liability is subject to a similar analysis.
All corporations depend on some level of abstraction, for they
give investors ownership in an intangible class of assets, namely
corporate shares, that do not have the solid tangible heft of land
and chattels. But at the same time it is absolutely necessary to
guard against the problem of double counting. The shares are
not one thing of value, and the underlying assets another. We
cannot increase social value by piling on an endless array of
holding companies to house the same tiny set of assets.
The gains from incorporation come from other quarters. Incorporation facilitates the trade of part interests in common assets, for it is far easier to sell one hundred shares of IBM than to
convey a tiny fractional interest in each and every bit of property, in each and every contract or lawsuit in which IBM has a
stake. In part, incorporation adopts by contract an elaborate
scheme of governance for common ventures, and in so doing partakes of the old property of associations and partnerships. In
this regard the sole distinctive feature of the corporation is one
that it cannot achieve by private agreement, but for which it
needs state assistance: limited liability against tort claims. Ordinary contracts between private parties cannot limit the rights of
strangers, yet limited liability does that with respect to the assets which shareholders commit to corporations. If creating

'5 See Coase, supra note 23, at 1-7; EMORD, supra note 23, at 167-74.
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cppyrights and patents necessarily infringes upon common law
rights, then limited liability does so as well.
Nonetheless this form of new property is also justified by
the enormous set of gains that it creates. Like patents and copyrights, limited liability is a feature open to all who select the
corporate form, at least after the nineteenth century reforms
made special charters of incorporation a practice of the past.20
All can avail themselves of the corporate form. More to the
point, the institution of limited liability may well increase the
level of protection that individuals receive against tortious
harms caused by strangers, an odd but fortunate paradox of regulation. Without limited liability, the size and scope of common
ventures would be small; persons of genuine means would not be
likely to commit their capital to risky ventures that carried with
them high chances of loss. But persons with modest wealth
might well be willing to do so, because insolvency is a better barrier against satisfying tort claims than any corporate veil. The
individual entrepreneur keeps all the gains from major risks but
escapes most of its burdens. Once limited liability is in place, it
is possible to coax wealthy individuals into committing some
fraction of their capital to common ventures. The new innovations can be backed by a pool of assets larger than those held by
any single individual, and the innovations that are developed
may well be safer than those of the obsolete cottage industry
technology that they displace. Any residual concerns with tort
liability can be answered in part by a requirement of liability
insurance-a corporate asset that can be set in fixed amounts
and made available exclusively to tort creditors. Limited liability
is a form of new property, but it is one whose mission is directed
toward the enhancement of the old virtues of industry and
production.
Limited liability thus creates a new distribution of property
rights, and it is, I believe, endowed with limited constitutional
protection. The individuals who are protected by limited liability when they make an investment should be able to keep that
protection even if the legislature subsequently decides to strip
corporate shareholders of their protection. A limited liability
statute creates the new baseline for transactions that were initi28

See Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of

Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1985).
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ated when it was still law. The state may decide to repeal limited liability prospectively in the general case; it cannot do so
with respect to transactions that were undertaken on the
strength of the old rules. Suppose the state declares by statute
to X, "You owe $100 to Y," whereupon Y can sue to collect the
debt. Surely there is a state taking of the $100 from X, which is
then transferred to Y. How does the situation differ if limited
liability, once sanctioned as a legitimate protection, is stripped
away in midstream, thereby exposing a shareholder to the full
extent of individual assets? There is no sharp division between
27
manipulation of the rules of liability and the rules of takings.
To allow protections once given and already justified to be removed without cause is an invitation to political intrigue. Yet so
long as the state has it in its power to chang6 the prospective
rules across the board, truly bad systems of liability will not long
remain in place. The fact that limited liability rules are regarded
as a permanent part of the legal landscape shows that the initial
judgments made above are correct: ex ante gains swamp losses.
IV.

WELFARE BENEFITS AND

A.

Property, Old and New

NEW "NEW

PROPERTY"

Public benefits have a pedigree vastly different from that of
any of the other forms of new property with which they are
sometimes confused. The use of the grand category of "new
property" to cover all property in opposition to land and chattels thus has the unfortunate consequence of obscuring the striking differences in function and design between benefits systems
and the intangible property rights already considered. The welfare benefits of Goldberg v. Kelly (like farm subsidies) arise out
of a conscious scheme of income support and wealth redistribution, arguably justified (unlike farm subsidies) by the differential marginal utility of money-utility which is normally posited
to decline with increases in wealth.
Note the relevant differences. Welfare rights are not
designed to allow the exploitation of new forms of wealth, nor to
facilitate the aggregation and efficient use of capital against insuperable holdout problems that otherwise block its use. Welfare

27

See R

EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

ch. 16 (1985).
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benefits are transfer payments that rely on the taxes imposed
upon some in order to provide the benefits that are received by
others. This system of benefits is subject to a number of objections, as regards the resources that it consumes and the unfortunate incentives that it creates-incentives that lead people to
substitute efforts to obtain or retain wealth through political
means that only transfer, but never create wealth. Whereas fashioning a regime of property rights in patents, copyrights, and the
broadcast spectrum works to create ex ante win/win situations,
the same cannot be said of any system of welfare rights, which
creates only win/lose situations.
One could argue that these objections to the transfer system
are so conclusive that the welfare rights strain of the new property is "bad" property or should not even be regarded as property at all. 28 But for the purposes of this Article I shall ignore
any difficulties arising from the coercion that is imposed upon
the transferors. Instead I shall treat the revenues that are
thereby rendered available to the state as though they were
manna from heaven. The only relevant questions for this analysis are directed to the relationship between the recipients and
the wealth provided them under the benefits program in
question.
Even from this perspective, clear and critical differences
emerge among the different forms of new property. As noted
earlier, there is strong reason to believe that patents, copyright
and broadcast frequencies are types of private property that can
only be taken by the state upon payment of just compensation.
Even limited liability once conferred could only be removed if
compensation for the increased exposure to loss is provided to
shareholders whose assets are placed at risk. Do we want to create eminent domain protection for the set of welfare benefits at
issue in Goldberg v. Kelly? Is it possible to say that once the
state institutes a system of welfare that promises to pay the recipient $100 per week, thereafter it may eliminate that benefit
payment only if it pays the recipient an equivalent capital sum
sufficient to fund the purchase of a $100 per week lifetime annuity? Similarly, if benefit levels are reduced, must the annuity be
purchased to offset that reduction? Or should welfare benefits

28 I have done so on practical and constitutional grounds. See, e.g., id. at ch. 19. See

also Epstein, Luck, 6 Soc. PHil & PoL'Y 17 (1988).
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be adjusted upward automatically, to reflect levels of inflation?
I think that everyone (including Justice Brennan) would recoil from these implications. So long as resources are scarce,
there is the clear expectation that no recipient has any vested
rights in the continuation of present welfare schemes. Future
welfare payments are made only so long as the scheme as a
whole is in effect, such that any rights to future payments depend upon the d6cision of the legislature to continue with the
funding program in question. Just as no special warrant is necessbry to increase the level of welfare benefits, so too none is necessary to decrease that level, or cut out the program in its entirety. The past practice, in other words, affords neither a ceiling
nor a floor for future practices or future politics. Welfare benefits are precarious and may be terminable by the state without
the consent of the recipient.2 9
B.

Unconstitutional Conditions and the Rule of Law

Thus far I have established that the "new property" of welfare benefits is not private property entitled to the protection of
the takings clause. Can welfare benefits be property for any
other purpose? Here the argument is that while the state may
decide to remove the entire system of support at its free will and
pleasure, it does not have a similar degree of freedom with respect to the benefits paid to any individual under the system. To
be sure, the point here does not constitute a total attack on all
conditions associated with individual benefit payments. The
state can condition welfare on the willingness to avoid crime or
drunkenness, to seek work, to furnish various reports, to produce identification cards, or to satisfy a host of other requirements. Yet even here the area bristles with complications, for
the state is not a private party. In its role of public trustee it
may be subject to certain constraints that would not exist for
private donors.
At this point the procedural protection of welfare benefits
under the Constitution lurches inexorably to the problem of unconstitutional conditions that has proved such a persistent ana29 Note that in this regard, welfare payments are no different from other rights that
government gives out, such as the grazing rights under the Taylor Act, which were held
revocable at will without compensation in United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
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lyt'ical sore point under modern American constitutional law.30
The source of the difficulty is the extent to which various claims
of constitutional protection are waived when an individual receives some benefit from the state by contract or grant. In the
private context it is clear that persons need not offer a ceitain
benefit at all; therefore it is said they possess the "lesser power"
which allows them to offer the benefit subject to whatever terms
and conditions they see fit to impose. This greater/lesser argument flows comfortably from the classical view of contract,
which does not seek to guess the relative strength, merits or legitimacy of the subjective preferences of the parties. Their consent is sufficient protection against any form of exploitation, and
once manifested allows a court to enforce the contract without
first satisfying itself of the substantive soundness of the bargain
for either side.
Clearly the greater/lesser argument does not hold in its universal form as against the state. The state cannot offer benefits
only to those individuals who agree, for example, to vote to keep
incumbents in office. In effect the wealth that is taken by force
from the citizenry at large is now being used to alter the behavior of private parties, with the sole object of enhancing the political fortunes of persons in power. It hardly matters that recipients who accept the condition are willing to help public officials
to enrich their private coffers, or to finance their reelection bids
at public expense. Where there are such implicit redistributions
of wealth along such forbidden axes as race, religion and sex, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine strikes at its hardest.
More generally, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is tied to the potential abuse of government power. It does not
require a per se invalidation of all conditional grants. The question that one has to ask in the context of Goldberg v. Kelly is
whether the prospect of abuse in the welfare context is sufficiently great to call for some limit on the ability of the state to

" The literature is enormous. See, e.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Sullivan,
UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HRv. L REv. 1413 (1989). See also Unconstitutional
Conditions Symposium, 26 SAN DMGO L. REv. 175 (1989), with contributions by Alexander, Epstein, Garvey, Kreimer, Marshall, McConnell, Rosenthal, Simons, Sullivan, Sunstein and Lee. My own major statement of views is found in Epstein, Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 HA~v. L REv. 4 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions].
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impose various procedural conditions on individual welfare recipients. It is just this position that is maintained, implicitly in
Goldberg, and explicitly in the impressive array of academic
writing that follows on its heels.
At one level the arguments in favor of Goldberg border on
the formalistic or the ritualistic. It is said that under the Constitution the state has the right to fashion property interests as it
sees fit-itself a conclusion that is at complete variance with the
Lockean tradition of bottom up property, but one indispensable
for having any system of welfare benefits at all. By the same
token it is then said that while the state has freedom with respect to the substantive dimensions of property, it lacks under
the due process clause a similar freedom to condition those benefits upon acceptance of certain procedural norms. But why is
the waiver not as good in the one context as in the other? It is
certainly not because there are certain or inherent limitations on
the nature and the structure of the grants. The ordinary grantor
could condition the receipt of a future sum of money on the filing of certain papers by the donee at the public recorder's office;
similarly the payment of welfare benefits could be conditioned
upon the recipient's agreeing to procedural norms.
If the limitation of the procedural side of the state grant
does not rest upon some inherent disability of the state as grantor, then it must rest upon functional concerns. In one sense unconstitutional conditions resonate with the principle of the "rule
of law," which tries to limit the arbitrary power of the state. And
any system which just allowed the state to take welfare benefits
away from individuals on a whim could be attacked on just those
grounds. William Simon defends the decision in Goldberg on
this line of argument.3 1 But I think that his defense of the rule is
misplaced in this context. The rule of law works at its best
within the framework of the minimal state in which the sole
functions of government are (i) to protect the liberty and property of all persons, and (ii) to overcome (via takings only with
just compensation) the raft of holdout and coordination
problems that attend ordinary political and social life.3 2 Under
' The connection between the rule of law and the pretermination hearing in
Goldberg is stressed in William Simon's criticism of this paper. See Simon, The Rule of
Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 777 (1990).
82 This is the theme of F. HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-75 (1944).
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those circumstances a sensible system is one that minimizes the
level of political discretion in order to promote the stability of
individual entitlements and expectations, and to limit the corrosive effects of faction and political intrigue.
Within this framework the rule of law should be understood
to require the normal requisites of procedure-notice, opportunity to be heard, and the presenting of evidence-in any private
common law action. The rule of law may be successfully carried
over to administrative contexts as well, at least where the function of the agency is to restrict those forms of common law
wrongs (fraud on the market, widespread pollution) that are not
easily remediable by private individual suits.35 In essence the
procedural safeguards of notice and hearings that are introduced
at the administrative level become the functional substitutes for
the procedural safeguards that are otherwise made available in
ordinary civil litigation.
With both common law adjudication and administrative decision making, however, the safeguards associated with the rule
of law principle work because the government acts chiefly in the
role of umpire and enforcer of private rights. But in the context
of welfare rights, the government abandons its nightwatchman
role and becomes an active participant in the social life of the
community. On the other side, the citizen does not wish to resist
government intrusion, but to obtain government benefits. The
change in both public and private roles has a powerful effect
upon the rule of law. Under its traditional conception, the rule
of law limits the discretion of the state, but it simultaneously
confers widespread freedom of contract on private actors, who
normally have complete discretion to make or refuse to make
any private agreement.
As a contracting party, should the state have any less discretion than its private counterpart? Why can't the state express
its preferences exactly as it sees fit? If private parties can act at
will on the strength of their "appetites," why can't the state
when acting as a (public) contracting party, or for that matter a
(public) donor? Contracting requires discretion, and redistribu33 Indeed, the most celebrated exposition of the rule of law was put forward precisely because of the concern over the potential for abuse by administrative bodies. See
A. DicmY. INMODUCTON To THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CoNs'rrrtnmo 203.04 (9th ed.
1941).
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tion requires even more of it. Many of the difficulties with the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can be traced to the
state's dual role first as market participant and then as an independent regulator. No invocation of the rule of law requires a
state to start or to continue a welfare program. That is purely a
political decision, which, once made, requires toleration of broad
public discretion. Why then does the rule of law require that
individual welfare benefits be cut off or reduced only after a
pretermination hearing? Simon is right to insist that I should be
very nervous about the exercise of arbitrary power, given my belief in limited government. I am. But he is wrong to expect the
same fidelity to the rule of law once government embarks on the
extensive redistributive activities and welfare payments that he
champions. Limited governments, bound by the stark conception of the rule of law, do not engage in these activities at all.
The state's dual role in the welfare system thus requires us
to look closely at the content of any individual condition to see
whether the state acts more as market participant or more as
regulator. The inquiry is a familiar one: Does the imposition of
that condition result in any factional or political abuse similar to
the cases mentioned above, that is, receipt of welfare on condition of payment to political party coffers? If so, then the case for
constitutional intervention on the question is securely founded
to combat the destructive political games that factions routinely
engender. If government officials seek to condition welfare
grants upon political loyalty, they should be subject to severe
sanctions, both civil and criminal. But even this possibility
leaves us a long way from Goldberg itself because it does not
speak to the necessity of any particular pretermination remedy.
With or without any pretermination hearing, officials who so
misbehave could be, and should be, subject to extensive liabilities at the hands of individual recipients. The legal system is
surely able to develop powerful alternative remedies-tort damages, criminal prosecution, loss of official position-to cope with
those forms of systemic misconduct, which are as likely to be
directed against new applicants for welfare (as yet not covered
by Goldberg)3 4 as existing ones.

The case for Goldberg's discrete constitutional conclu14

See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8

(1985).
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sion-that pretermination hearings are required-cannot rest
therefore on the need for curbing official misbehavior. Rather it
must rest on the question of whether the interests of welfare
beneficiaries require hearings prior to termination of benefits by
officials who are acting properly. How then might the argument
be made out in this restricted context? One possibility is that
the condition in the grant that denies pretermination rights unfairly exploits the vulnerable position of the poor. But surely the
grant of welfare subject to condition does not make the recipients worse off than they would have been without any welfare
benefits at all, even if it does make them worse off than having
the grant without the condition. More specifically, the want of a
pretermination hearing does not appear to spearhead any official
effort to capture a disproportionate fraction of the gains from
certain private activities, or to disrupt the operation of competitive markets, of the sort that occurs whenever certain conditions
are imposed upon the use of public highways or on the ability to
ship goods in interstate commerce. s The conditions, at least to
this outsider, appear to be a decided mixed blessing. They are
the source of potential hardship to persons whose benefits are
wrongfully terminated, but a much needed weapon to strike at
potential abuse by recipients."'
C.

The Budget Constraint

There is an instructive way to test this last point. Let us
suppose that a certain sum of money is budgeted to the welfare
system. The question then arises how the funds should be allocated internally to the various parts of its operation. In the simplest model, the money can be spent either on direct payments
to recipients or on procedural safeguards (such as a pretermination hearing) for those same recipients. But since the budget is
fixed, the designer of the welfare system faces one iron constraint. Every dollar that is spent on procedural safeguards is a

See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 US. 583 (1926);
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (discussed in Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, supra rfote 30, at 40-44, 47-54).
3' This point was stressed in Justice Black's dissent, where he noted that the difficulties of getting individuals off the welfare rolls may lead to a greater initial reluctance
to put them on. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting). The theme is
also picked up with great force in Verkuil, supra note 12, at 367-69.
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dollar that cannot be spent on direct payments. The question is,
what allocation gives the maximum system delivery for recipients-present and future-from the available funds?
One possible allocation is to spend every last cent on recipient benefits and none on procedural protections. But there are
risks to that approach because of the danger that benefits will be
cut off by officials who are acting out of petty motives, personal
hostilities, ignorance, laziness or sheer impatience: the problems
the rule of law seeks to combat do not disappear with the administrative state. There is also some danger that conscientious
officials will misapply or misinterpret the relevant rules and
make erroneous cancellations. It may well be that the risks of
erroneous or arbitrary determinations will lead to a decline in
confidence in the system and to a rise of insecurity that reduces
the value of the benefits paid out. A shift of some of the monies
from direct payments to procedural safeguards against termination could be viewed (ex ante) by the class of potential recipients as well worth the reduction in the total cash benefits required to keep the budget in balance. The situation is hardly
distinguishable from workers who are willing to accept some reduction in salary in order to obtain some protections (perhaps
only informal protections that cannot be asserted in court)
against arbitrary dismissal. There is no reason a priori to assume
that recipients of welfare, employment or social security benefits
want all cash and no procedures, and perhaps some good reason
to think that they want some procedural protection.
But how much? Unfortunately, there is no natural cut that
instructs us as to what fraction of resources should be devoted to
procedural protection and what fraction to recipient payouts. If
one looks at private employment systems, there is no single set
of practices that uniquely identifies the level of procedural protection given to workers under contract. For some businesses
with large workforces and stable employment relationships, it
might be possible to give extensive protection. In other firms,
buffeted by radical technological transformations, insecurity
may be the order of the day for shareholder, manager, and employee alike. Likewise, private charitable organizations often try
to give some procedural protection to their beneficiaries, but
again it is not clear how much is appropriate for any particular
case or whether the same amount is appropriate for all cases.
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D. Micromanaging the Welfare System
It is here that we come to the crux of the difficulty with the
constitutional enforcement of procedural standards. For these
standards to be sensible we have to have a clear sense that there
is some open avenue for political abuse, for it is against those
shortfalls that constitutions are designed to guard. In addition,
there has to be some reason for us to believe the courts know
better than legislatures and administrators when abuse is likely
to occur and what safeguards are likely to prevent it. But the
basic problem of how to allocate the funds does not generate
anything like a unique or ideal answer, even when the well-motivated, all-knowing single official is put in charge.
Where then is the certainty, or even the decent probability,
that the type of pretermination hearing that a court demands is
better than the type of post-termination hearing that the political process provides by statute? With eminent domain it is easy
to trace the set of abuses that exist when property is taken vdthout just compensation: the breakdown in the political process
leads to costly factional struggles which result in property being
forcibly transferred from higher to lower valued uses. The public
thus loses in three ways. It expends valuable resources in order
to achieve inferior allocative results, with skewed distributional
consequences.
There is no parallel scenario for abuse with the termination
of welfare, social security or employment benefits. Most critically, it is highly unlikely that the political process will yield no
protection at all, for the persons who want to establish a welfare
program generally want to do it right. And historically, the political system did generate some protections against arbitrary conduct. Indeed, as Justice Brennan observed in Goldberg, the applicable New York procedures required that notice be given
seven days before termination, and that, at the recipient's request, any decision to terminate or suspend benefits could be
subject to internal review before implementation." The petition
of the recipient could be supported by a written statement. Any
termination decision had to be supported by reasons given in
writing, and could not take effect until that writing was delivered to the recipient. But there was no opportunity to be heard

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 257-60.
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in person prior to the termination, the asserted constitutional
38
defect in the procedures.
In principle the single omniscient administrator should seek
to ask the question of whether any additional precautions prior
to termination are worthwhile, given those that are in place.
That determination requires an assessment of both forms of error-wrongful termination, and wrongful continuation-that exist under the two regimes. The analysis supports the additional
protection only if some further gain in systemwide reliability is
obtained at some acceptable cost. One should have thought, as
Justice Black pointed out in his Goldberg dissent, that this
quintessential empirical question is not all that different from
the question of whether a lender should be required to make an
unsecured loan to a given borrower when the risk of default is
high and the possibility of nonpayment substantial.3 9 Figuring
out the business .risks of alternative strategies should have led
Justice Brennan in Goldberg to offer a comprehensive analysis
of the operational deficiencies of the welfare system. That discussion should in turn have forced an explicit confrontation with
the question of whether the increased protection of present beneficiaries represents an overall improvement in the operation of
the system for its present and future recipients. But Justice
Brennan's opinion resists any detailed institutional evaluation
and sticks instead to a very high level of generality. It makes no
attempt to show that its new-found constitutional requirement
leads to, or even should be expected to lead to a better legal
order that reduces errors, and thus offsets the increased costs of
running the system.
In most cases, the decision regarding allocation of public
benefits falls to the legislature that appropriates the necessary
funds. In general the judicial role is to intervene only where the
court can detect some miscarriage in that process, which
promises a net gain from intervention. But in Goldberg I am
hard-pressed to see that this gain is manifest, if it exists at all,
and hence I am unconvinced that "property" in the due process
clause should be used to disregard conditions that are otherwise
imposed. Surely it is not possible to say here that the political
process has failed utterly, even from Justice Brennan's perspecId.
" Id. at 277 (Black, J., dissenting).
38
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tive, given the level of procedural protection that it did generate.
Why then ask the courts to micromanage the difference?
There is one further indication of the structural weaknesses
of Goldberg. Simply, the question is what happens after the
original decision is taken? Under the view that I have urged,
there is little constitutional work left to do: the political process
is allowed to work out its accommodations as best it can, subject
to rules that constrain its operation in cases of invidious behavior. If the relative costs and benefits change, the government is
of course free to institute these hearings. I suspect that even if
Goldberg had come out the other way in 1970, some pretermination hearing would have been introduced in welfare cases as a
statutory or administrative matter shortly thereafter, but it is
hard to be sure.
Under the Brennan position in Goldberg, however, the following questions cannot be avoided. If there is a hearing, what
sort of a hearing must it be? When must it be given? Must counsel be allowed to appear? What kinds of evidence are admissible? What standards of review are required? Who receives the
hearing? There are no authoritative, even plausible, constitutional answers. We cannot expect otherwise. The initial judgment in favor of the hearing required empirical estimations that
were not made. How then can these more refined judgments be
made once moral indignation is put to one side, so only matters
of implementation remain? I don't have the answers, but
neither, I think, does anyone else.40
E. Reason, Passion-andIndirect Effects
In large measure my view of Goldberg echoes the doubts
that Justice Black expressed in his forceful dissent in Goldberg
itself.41 On balance I do not think that Justice Brennan's original opinion meets any of Justice Black's sensible objections. The
same can be said, I think, of Justice Brennan's more recent de4 For empirical accounts of the burdens that hearings have imposed upon the welfare system, see D. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAL--v AND MASS AD.uNisTRATnE JusTIcE
(1974), noting that as of 1974 a staff of about 3,000 persons (2,500 front line personnel
and about 500 supervisors) were needed to handle the caseload in New York City alone.
The hearings are conducted by state, not city personnel, and are run on a mas production/assembly line basis.
41 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (Black, J., dissenting).
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fense of his decision in Goldberg before the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York in September 1987. In that speech
Justice Brennan did not confront the entire controversy of unconstitutional conditions, nor did he make any claim that his
conception of "positive liberty" carries with it the striking implication that there is some constitutional duty to provide for welfare benefits.42
Instead he contented himself with a general proposition:
that the desire for rational structures should not be so strong as
to overcome the "passions" (I would say,"compassion," but the
point is a detail) and deeper concerns that animate reasoning
under the due process clause. He writes that while some have
seen "Goldberg as a triumph of the model of reason," he preferred to look at it as "an expression of the importance of passion in governmental conduct, in the sense of attention to the
concrete human realities at stake. From this perspective,
Goldberg can be seen as injecting passion into a system whose
43
abstract rationality had led it astray."

To reinforce that perspective he set out the account from
the brief of recipient Angela Velez who suffered unspeakable
personal tragedies from the erroneous cutoff of welfare benefits.
It is of course not possible from this vantage point to verify the
truth of the story, or to contest it by introducing other factors
which may well place the entire unfortunate episode in a different light. But even if we waive the right of cross-examination,
and take Ms. Velez's story at face value, many disturbing questions still remain. There is no certainty before proceedings are
undertaken whether the cutoff of welfare benefits in a particular
case is justified or not. A requirement of pretermination hearings may well protect persons in the position of Ms. Velez. But it
42 But just that claim is made in this Symposium by Charles Reich in his paper,
Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV.
731, 733 (1990), which posits "communal responsibility" to provide "a full constitutional
guarantee" of economic security. "[T]he due process clause must mean that no person
can be denied the means to economic survival." Id. at 742. Reich must contemplate a
constitutional duty to impose taxes to fund these obligations. But, if the system of taxation and distribution destroys the incentive to produce, his grand plan to make the state
the provider of last resort will reduce us to a level of abject poverty. One cannot redistribute goods and services that are not produced.
"' Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," The Forty-Second
Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, 42 THE RECORD OF THE AssOCIATION OF TIE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 948, 971 (1987).
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will also create opportunities for those persons who abuse the

system to remain on the welfare rolls longer than they should.
Justice Brennan has replied to that objection by pointing to
the "drastic consequences of terminating a recipient's only
means of subsistence.""" No one should make light of that risk,
but the two questions here are interdependent. If the wrong per-

sons remain on welfare, then there is less money available in the
bank, given the budget constraints, to take care of persons like

Ms. Velez. The effort to minimize the dislocations that come
with wrongful termination may only increase the delays in getting other needy people onto the welfare rolls in the first place.4
In the interim they may suffer consequences as bad as those
which attended the wrongful termination of Ms. Velez. The object of the system of welfare is not to minimize the human tragedies that follow wrongful termination. It is to minimize the
human tragedies that follow from all phases of the operation of
the system.

In this connection it is instructive to recall some of the indirect consequences of Goldberg that were outlined in powerful
fashion by Professor Jerry Mashaw in 1985, two years before
Justice Brennan's speech:
These administrative difficulties [after Goldberg] reinforced a political difficulty. Welfare rolls were already increasing rapidly. State

legislators were unwilling to provide more funds either for well-constructed hearings or for welfare benefits. A strategy was needed that
would preserve fiscal integrity and produce defensible decisions.
A number of tactical moves ultimately comprised the grand design. One was to tighten up and slow down the initial eligibility determination process. Another was to generalize and objectify the substantive eligibility criteria so that messy subjective judgments about
individual cases would not have to be made and defended. This move
led to the realization that professional social workers were no longer
needed. Costs could be reduced further by lowering the quality of the
staff and by depersonalizing staff-claimant encounters. If these reactions were not sufficient to restore fiscal balance, then payment levels
could be reduced or allowed to remain stable in the face of rising
prices. A tougher stance was also to be taken with respect to work
requirements and prosecution of absent parents. Moreover, because
hearings presumably protected the claimants' interests, internal audit
procedures were skewed to ignore nonpayment and underpayment

Id. at 972.
4A point also stressed in Verkuil, supra note 12, at 369.
4
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problems and to concentrate on preventing over-payments and payments to ineligibles.4

Mashaw's account makes clear what we can expect to happen in practice when all the "concrete realities," to use Justice
Brennan's phrase, are taken into account. Intake, supervision,
and treatment are as important as retention. And they are all
interconnected by the inexorable budget constraints which drive
Mashaw's analysis, but which Justice Brennan's analysis ignores.
By focusing only on one aspect of the problem, Justice Brennan
understates the level of complexity that is attached to the decisions that he makes, and he does so in a way that improperly
biases the inquiry in favor of the outcome in Goldberg. The
gains are paraded in public, but the losses remain undiscussed.
There are of course further issues that must be explored by
persons closer to the welfare system than I. It is far from obvious that all the changes in the welfare system that followed
Goldberg were driven exclusively by the constitutional requirement of a hearing. It could well be that the increased number of
persons on the rolls sparked many of the profound institutional
changes that Mashaw reports. There is nothing which says that
some form of hearing, internally driven by the demands of the
welfare system is inappropriate. In his own contribution to this
volume, Commissioner Cesar A. Perales of the New York State
Department of Social Services defends the decisionin Goldberg,
which by his own description runs on a production line basis. 47
But even if this can be done at reasonable cost, the basic point
remains. If the hearings are introduced from within the system,
then they can be bent, modified and altered as seen fit, so that
they no longer remain an inflexible part of the overall apparatus
come hell or high water. Who requires a hearing is as important
as deciding what kind of hearing is required.
At root my disagreement with Justice Brennan rests on his
refusal to understand the role of indirect consequences in evalu-

" J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 34-35 (1985). 1 thank Professor Peter Strauss for calling this quotation to my attention after I had written the
original theoretical discussion.
" Perales, The Fair Hearings Process: Guardianof the Social Services System, 56
BROOKLYN L. REv. 889 (1990). "[H]earing officers face calendars of twenty-eight to thirtyfive scheduled hearings daily and draft decisions on a statewide computer system which
can print and issue a decision in Albany the same day." Id. at 891. "The Department
schedules eight hundred hearings a day, every day." Id. at 892.
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ating the behavior of complex social institutions. His constant
refrain is an appeal to human "dignity," but the relevant inquiry
is always how to maximize human dignity under conditions of
scarcity. The failure to take into account the institutional responses to scarcity is a fatal gap in his analysis. Goldberg v.
Kelly cannot simply bask in the glow of the winners from the
system. A rational analysis of its consequences is not undertaken
to oust passion or to undermine compassion. It is to insure that
the question of ends does not submerge genuine doubts on the
question of means, both political and legal. The literature on
regulation is replete with instances of "unanticipated consequences" of rules that frustrate the very ends they seek to serve.
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's impassioned defense,
Goldberg amounts in the end to another regulatory misadventure, albeit one of constitutional dimensions.
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